Limitation
The Limitation Act of 1980 prescribes strict time limits with which the claimant must bring proceedings. If a claim is brought outside of these time limits then it may be statute barred. This makes it essential for you to consider the operation of the relevant limitation period at the outset of the case in order to properly advise your client on whether they have a claim.
Limitation for contract and Tort are set out in sections 2 and 5 of the Limitation Act accordingly.
Section 2 Time limit for actions founded on tort.
An action founded on tort shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
5 Time limit for actions founded on simple contract.
An action founded on simple contract shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
In relation to both, the Claimant has 6 years from the date that the cause of action arose to commence their proceedings, with the limitation period starting from the day after.
In contract the cause of action accrues as soon as the breach of contract of contract occurs. This will be a question of fact to be determined by the Court. In tort, the cause of action accrues when the tort is committed. Both of these could be matters of fact for consideration by the Court. However, it is important that you identify if this represents a potential weakness in your client’ case and that they are properly advised on that weakness if they choose to proceed.
11 Special time limit for actions in respect of personal injuries.
(1) This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person.
(2) None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act shall apply to an action to which this section applies.
(3) An action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period applicable in accordance with subsection (4) or (5) below.
(4) Except where subsection (5) below applies, the period applicable is three years from—
(a) the date on which the cause of action accrued; or
(b) the date of knowledge (if later) of the person injured.
This section stipulates that, personal injury cases the limitation period is 3 years which runs from the date of the cause of action or the date of knowledge of the person involved, whichever is later. This excludes children, for whom the limitation period does not begin to until their 18th birthday.
There is an additional complicating factor under section 14A, which provides for the limitation period where the facts of the cause of action are not known at the date of accrual. This is most likely to be used in cases where the damage from, say, negligence remains latent – or hidden. This provision allows for some flexibility in bringing cases where it cannot be expected that the claimant would know about their cause of action.
14A Special time limit for negligence actions where facts relevant to cause of action are not known at date of accrual.
(1) This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, other than one to which section 11 of this Act applies, where the starting date for reckoning the period of limitation under subsection (4)(b) below falls after the date on which the cause of action accrued.
(2) Section 2 of this Act shall not apply to an action to which this section applies.
(3) An action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period applicable in accordance with subsection (4) below.
(4) That period is either—
(a) six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued; or
(b) three years from the starting date as defined by subsection (5) below, if that period expires later than the period mentioned in paragraph (a) above.
So then we have to look at subsection (5), which tells us:
(5) For the purposes of this section, the starting date for reckoning the period of limitation under subsection (4)(b) above is the earliest date on which the plaintiff or any person in whom the cause of action was vested before him first had both the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage and a right to bring such an action.
So, taken together, this section allows a starting date for the purpose of calculating limitation to be the earliest date on which the plaintiff (the Claimant) or any person in whom the cause of action was vested before him first had knowledge required for bringing an action. The limitation period will then be 3 years from that date or six years from the date on which the cause of action actually accrued.
A v Hoare 2008 – UKHL 6: In this case, each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House allow a discretion to the court to extend the limitation period. The House was also asked as to whether the claimant’s personal characteristics could affect the finding of ‘significant injury’ under section 14(2).
The Court held that all claims for personal injuries, whether based in negligence or assault, are subject to the limitation periods provided for by section 11 of the 1980 Act which itself is subject to the discretion of the court provided by section 33 of the 1980 Act.
Lord Hoffmann discussed section 33 of the 1980 Act saying: ‘Section 33 enables the judge to look at the matter broadly and not have to decide the highly artificial question of whether knowledge which the claimant has in some sense suppressed counts as knowledge for the purposes of the Act . The judge is expressly enjoined by subsection (3)(a) to have regard to the reasons for delay and in my opinion this requires him to give due weight to evidence, such as there was in this case, that the claimant was for practical purposes disabled from commencing proceedings by the psychological injuries which he had suffered.’
Lord Browne discussed the consequences of long delay: ‘Whether or not it will be possible for defendants to investigate these (allegations) sufficiently for there to be a reasonable prospect of a fair trial will depend upon a number of factors, not least when the complaint was first made and with what effect. If a complaint has been made and recorded, and more obviously still if the accused has been convicted of the abuse complained of, that will be one thing; if, however, a complaint comes out of the blue with no apparent support for it (other perhaps than the alleged abuser has been accused or even convicted of similar abuse in the past), that would be another thing.’
